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THE DUTY OF DIRECTORS TO NON-SHAREHOLDER
CONSTITUENCIES IN CONTROL TRANSACTIONS-A
COMPARISON OF U.S. AND U.K. LAW
Roberta S. Karmel*
INTRODUCTION
Directors of corporations in the United States and the United King-
dom owe fiduciary duties to their shareholders which are based on the
same common law tradition.' The scope and nature of these duties are
being tested by the market for corporate control being waged on both
sides of the Atlantic.' Among other developments, non-shareholder con-
stituencies, especially employees3 and bondholders,4 are asserting that
their interests as well as shareholders' interests should be considered by
directors deliberating a control transaction. The claims of non-share-
holder constituencies have drawn mixed response.
This article will compare the law relating to non-shareholder claims
in the United States and the United Kingdom. Very generally, U.S. law is
evolving to the view that directors may, but are not required, to consider
non-shareholder interests. In the United Kingdom, the duty to sharehold-
ers is formulated as a duty to future as well as current shareholders,
which, as a practical matter, may involve taking non-shareholder constit-
uencies into account. Further, U.K. directors owe a general duty to em-
*Roberta S. Karmel, B.A. Radcliffe 1959; LL.B. New York University 1962, is a Profes-
sor of Law and Co-Director of the Center for the Study of International Business Law,
Brooklyn Law School. She is also a Partner of Kelley Drye & Warren and was a Commis-
sioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1977-80. During the Fall 1989 term,
she was a Visiting Professor at the University of Notre Dame London Law Centre, where
she performed some of the research for this article. A research stipend from Brooklyn Law
School was helpful in the preparation of this article. The research assistance of Brooklyn
Law School students Lee Michael Huttner and Lawrence R. Plotkin is gratefully acknowl-
edged. The comments of John L.T. Newbegin and Ann Giles of Cameron Markby Hewitt
and of Professor Arthur Pinto of Brooklyn Law School were helpful and appreciated. The
date of this article is November 1, 1989.
1. See Charitable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400 (1742).
2. Although hostile takeovers are a relatively recent phenomenon in Europe, U.S.
techniques are being exported to Britain. See Lublin & Forman, Europe's Merger Boom
Triggers an Invasion by U.S. Deal Makers, Wall St. J., Aug. 23, 1989, at Al, col. 6. See
generally Brayne, Tender Offers Involving U.K. Companies, 21 REv. oF SEC. & COMM. REG.
(Standard & Poor's) 67 (Apr. 27, 1988). The Gold Fields and B.A.T. battles have been trans-
atlantic corporate control contests. See A Tale of Two Takeovers, Wall St. J., July 17, 1989,
at A10, col. 1. See also Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d
Cir. 1989), app. pending. Management buy-outs also have become popular. See Larger
Management Buy-Outs 1981/1989, Fin. Times, Oct. 11, 1989, at §§ III, XIL
3. For a discussion of employee claims, see infra notes 29-57 and accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of bondholder claims, see infra notes 58-81 and accompanying text.
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ployees. Yet, any direct duty to employees or creditors in a takeover is
inchoate in both countries.
Nevertheless, U.S. corporations have seized upon the idea of non-
shareholder interests as a way to shift decision making about a corpora-
tion's future from shareholders to management. Whether U.K. boards
could do the same thing is an interesting question. A potential threat to
the flexibility of board decision making is that a change in the political
environment could transform the freedom to consider non-shareholder
constituencies into a legal obligation.
I. DUTIES OF DIRECTORS UNDER U.S. LAW
A. Duties to Shareholders
1. Care and loyalty
Although federal regulation, in particular the federal securities laws,5
impose various duties on directors of U.S. corporations to stockholders
and others, the basic duties of care and loyalty are governed by state law.
The duty of care which directors owe to their corporation and its share-
holders is generally expressed as that degree of skill, diligence and care
that an ordinary prudent person would exercise in similar circumstances.0
The duty of loyalty, sometimes expressed as a duty of fair dealing,7 re-
quires directors who have a conflict of interest to demonstrate the fair-
ness of a transaction in which they are interested.8
The burdens imposed upon directors by the duties of care and loy-
alty are threshold requirements that must be met before a court will ap-
ply the business judgment rule, which shields directors from liability for
disinterested business decisions made with due care, in good faith, and
without an abuse of discretion.9 Classic corporation law principles con-
cerning the duties of care and loyalty and the business judgment rule
have been severely strained by the takeover battles of the past decade.
In reaction to the highly publicized Smith v. Van Gorkom case 0 im-
posing liability on directors for failure to exercise due care in a change of
control situation, Delaware and numerous other states passed legislation
5. Disclosure obligations in public offerings are imposed by the Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988). Shareholders are accorded additional informational rights
under the proxy provisions, tender offer provisions and antifraud provisions of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7711 (1988). As a general matter, breaches of
fiduciary duty are not actionable under the federal securities laws. Santa Fe Industries, Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977).
6. REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORPORATION ACT § 8.30 (1984). See D. BLOCK, N. BARTON
& S. RADIN, THE BusiNEss JUDGMENT RuLE 28 (2d ed. 1988).
7. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983).
8. W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 931 (perm. ed. 1986). See ALI, PRINCI-
PLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.08 at 107. (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1984) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].
9. D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, supra note 6, at 12.
10. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). This case and its aftermath are discussed in A.
FLEISCHER, G. HAZARD & M. KLIPPER, BOARD GAMES (1988).
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permitting corporations to limit or eliminate the personal liability of di-
rectors for breach of the duty of care.1 However, in cases involving target
company defenses against hostile takeovers, the line between the duty of
care and the duty of loyalty has sometimes become blurred because
courts recognize that directors often are interested in remaining in
office.12
In the context of a takeover, the business judgment rule grants the
same protection to directors as in any other context. Directors can use
their business judgment to keep a corporation independent. However, in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 3 the Delaware Supreme Court de-
veloped two prerequisites for the application of the business judgment
rule to anti-takeover measures. First, the board must demonstrate good
faith and a reasonable investigation to prove that protection of the corpo-
rate enterprise and shareholders is necessary. Second, defensive measures
must be reasonable in the face of the threat posed.
2. Long-term versus short-term values
There is no requirement that directors sell a company to the highest
bidder unless the corporation is engaged in a sale of the firm or change of
control transaction. 14 Therefore, the duty of corporate directors does not
become solely one of profit maximization unless and until sale of the com-
pany is inevitable.1 5 This important principle that directors may prefer
long-term value over short-term shareholder gain, and need not sell a
company to the highest bidder, was affirmed, at least for Delaware corpo-
rations, in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.'" The facts of
the Paramount case are instructive because they suggest that long-term
11. In Delaware shareholders can adopt a charter provision limiting or even eliminat-
ing the personal liability of a director except for breach of the duty of loyalty or intentional
misconduct. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1974 & Cum. Supp.1988). Many other states
have followed this approach. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp.
1988). Other states have simply lowered the duty of care. See Hazen, Corporate Directors'
Accountability: The Race to the Bottom-The Second Lap, 66 N.C. L. REV. 171, 174-77
(1984). Some have even suggested that directors be permitted to opt out of duty of loyalty
obligations. See generally Branson, Assault on Another Citadel: Attempts to Curtail the
Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corporate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 376
(1988).
12. When a board fights a takeover, there is the danger that it is "acting primarily in
its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders." Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
13. Id.
14. Reder, The Obligation of a Director of a Delaware Corporation to Act as an Auc-
tioneer, 44 Bus. LAW. 275, 279 (1989).
15. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986). Even an exclusive duty to shareholders in an auction of the company allows directors
to consider factors in addition to price such as the form of the consideration paid, timing
and probability of consummation. In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Shareholders Litigation,
542 A.2d 770, 781 n.6 (Del. Ch. 1988).
16. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) q 94,514 at 93,264 (Del. Ch. July
14, 1989), aff'd, Literary Partners, L.P. v. Time, Inc., (Del. 1989) (Lexis, States Library, Del.
file).
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value may not be exclusively economic. In July, 1988, the board of direc-
tors of Time Incorporated ("Time") authorized its management to negoti-
ate a merger agreement with Warner Communications Inc. ("Warner").
From the outset, the merger was conditioned on a desire to maintain an
independent Time culture. This included succession of Time management
to senior positions in the merged entity. Of serious importance was the
continued editorial independence of Time magazine. On March 3, 1989,
the directors of Warner and Time, both Delaware corporations, agreed to
a merger whereby Warner shareholders would receive .465 shares of Time
for each share of Warner. At the conclusion of the merger, Warner share-
holders would own approximately 62 per cent of the outstanding shares of
the new combined entity.
The new combined entity would not have been highly leveraged.
Since the merger agreement provided that only Warner shares would be
converted, Delaware law required a vote only by Warner shareholders."
However, the rules of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. ("NYSE") re-
quired a vote by Time shareholders too, 18 so the merger agreement pro-
vided for a vote by the shareholders of both companies. Time's
shareholders were scheduled to vote on June 23, 1989.
On June 7, 1989, Paramount Communications, Inc. ("Paramount")
made a cash tender offer for all outstanding Time common stock at $175
a share. At a June 16, 1989, meeting, Time's board concluded that the
Paramount offer was inadequate. The board also concluded that it was
not in the long-term interest of Time or its shareholders to sell the corpo-
ration at that time. Accordingly, Time's board restructured the merger as
a tender offer by Time for Warner stock at $70 a share. The tender made
shareholder approval unnecessary and also resulted in a significant lever-
aging of Time. 19 Paramount, joined by both substantial individual Time
shareholders and a purported shareholder class, sued to enjoin the Time
tender offer for Warner.
Chancellor Allen was confronted with two issues: first, whether
Time's directors were under an obligation to seek, in good faith, only to
maximize current share value on June 16; second, whether the circum-
stances imposed upon the Time board a fiduciary obligation to afford to
shareholders a choice with respect to whether the corporation should be
sold or managed for the long term. Both questions were answered in the
negative. The court held that the original merger agreement was not a
change of control transaction because the shares of Time and Warner
were so widely held that neither corporation could be said to be acquiring
the other. "Control of both remained in a large, fluid, changeable and
changing market."20 Moreover, Chancellor Allen held that the Time
17. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
18. N.Y.S.E. Rule 312, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 1 2312 (1988).
19. See Kneale, Time Warner Offers a Cashless Package of Stock for Remaining
Warner Shares, Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 1989, at A2, col. 2.
20. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,514, at 93,280. The court
recognized that Time shareholders would have suffered dilution. This is the basis of the
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board was under no duty to let the Time shareholders decide whether the
Paramount offer was better than the Time tender offer. This was because
the Time board's restructuring was a reasonable response to the threat
that its long term strategic plan would be thwarted.
The interesting question in this case is just what was the long-term
value the directors were allowed to protect against the wishes of their
shareholders. Although Chancellor Allen found that the Time directors
were concerned "for the larger role of the enterprise in society," he de-
cided that there was an "insufficient basis to suppose. . . that such con-
cerns caused the directors to sacrifice or ignore their duty to seek to
maximize in the long run financial returns to the corporation and its
stockholders." '21 Yet, the Chancellor acknowledged that in an efficient
well-developed stock market there should be "no discount for long-term
profit maximizing behavior except that reflected in the discount for the
time value of money. '22 Further, he recognized that the concept of long-
term management includes charitable giving and similar endeavors.23
Defensive recapitalizations have been upheld in prior cases. 24 Fur-
ther, the principle that directors need not pursue immediate maximiza-
tion of share value at the expense of long-term strategic plans had been
articulated previously.25 Indeed, in a prior case in which Chancellor Allen
refused to compel a board of directors to redeem a shareholder rights
("poison pill") plan in the face of a tender offer conditioned on such re-
demption, the court recognized that the proposition that directors owe a
duty "to the corporation and its shareholders" masks the fundamental
issue. What interest does the board represent in resolving shareholder
long-term interests, or corporate entity interests, or multi-constituency
interests on the one hand, and shareholder short-term interests or current
share value interests on the other hand?2 Further, permitting directors
to consider long-term interests allows them to support research and prod-
uct development, personnel training and compensation, and charitable
and community support.27 Nevertheless, Paramount goes somewhat fur-
ther than prior cases in permitting directors to consider constituencies
beyond today's shareholders.28
NYSE rule requiring a shareholder vote in such situations, supra note 18. The significance
of this ruling to the case is that if there is no sale of control, there is no "Revlon" duty to
maximize a sale price.
21. Id. at 93,269.
22. Id. at 93,277. In his view, directors may reject efficient market theory and operate
on the theory that stock market valuation is "wrong."
23. Id. at n.15.
24. E.g., City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.
1988), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988); GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624
F. Supp. 1016 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
25. TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,334 at 92,173 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).
26. Id. at 92,178.
27. Id. at n.6.
28. "The mission of the firm is not seen by those involved with it as wholly economic,
nor the continued existence of its distinctive identity as a matter of indifference." [1989
1990]
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B. Duties to Employees
1. The stakeholder statutes
Under classic U.S. corporation law, the primary beneficiaries of the
duties owed by directors are the shareholders, 29 because a basic objective
of the corporation is to enhance shareholder value.30 However, a develop-
ing suspicion of institutional investors who hold stock only for short-term
gain-" and the perception that hostile takeovers result in the loss of em-
ployment3 2 have persuaded some state legislators to change the nature of
a director's duty, substituting the concept of duty to various constituen-
cies for the traditional duty to shareholders.3 3 These "stakeholder" stat-
utes are different from the change of control statutes which purport to
protect shareholders,34 but have been passed at the behest of similar non-
shareholder constituencies and have the effect of thwarting hostile
takeovers. 5
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,514 at 93,269.
29. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919); Berle,
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REV. 1049 (1931). Directors owe their
duties to the shareholders as a body, not to individual shareholders. 3 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 848 (rev. perm. ed. 1986). For a discus-
sion of directors' duties to shareholders, see infra note 84 and accompanying text.
30. See Schwartz, Defining the Corporate Objective: Section 2.01 of the ALI's Princi-
ples, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511, 512, 528-29 (1984).
31. See Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 104
(1979).
32. See Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1, 70 (1986); Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L.
REV. 111, 120-22 (1987).
33. See Coffee, The Future of Corporate Federalism: State Competition and the New
Trend Toward De Facto Federal Minimum Standards, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 759, 770 (1987);
Karmel, Duty to the Target: Is an Attorney's Duty to the Corporation a Paradigm for
Directors?, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 695 (1988); Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of
Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 35-43 (1987).
34. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988) is typical. It prohibits an
interested shareholder (20% holder) from effecting any business combination with the cor-
poration for a period of 5 years unless there is approval by the board of directors of either
the purchase of the 20% interest or the interested business combination. A similar Indiana
statute was held constitutional in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 94
(1987). For a discussion of the constitutional issues, see Pinto, The Constitution and the
Market for Corporate Control: State Takeover Statutes after CTS Corp., 29 WILLIAM &
MARY L. REV. 699 (1988). This type of "control share" statute shifts power from the share-
holders to the board of directors. After this case, the North American Securities Administra-
tors Association and the American Bar Association proposed a Model Control Share Act, 20
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 708 (May 6, 1988). The Delaware statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 203 (Supp. 1989), which forces an interested business combination to a vote by disinter-
ested shareholders, represents a less dramatic shift of power to the board. Since "control
share" statutes are purporedly based on a duty to shareholders, they will not be discussed
further in this article.
35. Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 846 (1989); Note, Takeover Dangers and Non-Shareholders: Who Should Be Our
Brothers' Keeper?, 1 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 301, 304-08 (1988). A similar anti-takeover inter-
est group may be developing in the United Kingdom. See Waller, Merger Mania Comes
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The first stakeholder statute was passed in Pennsylvania in 1986 and
provides that in discharging their duties directors may, "in considering
the best interests of the corporation, consider the effects of any action
upon employees, upon suppliers and customers of the corporation, and
upon communities in which offices or other establishments of the corpora-
tion are located, and all other pertinent factors."36 More than a dozen
states have passed similar laws.37
Some of the statutes formulate the stakeholder concept in terms of
long-term shareholder value and permit directors to consider the current
value of the corporation in an orderly liquidation or sale versus the future
value of the corporation over a period of years as an independent entity.3 '
The recently enacted New York statute is broadly worded and addressed
to a wide range of constituencies. It provides that in taking action as a
director, including voting on any potential or actual change of control of
the corporation,
•... a director shall be entitled to consider, without limitation, (1)
both the long-term and short-term interests of the corporation and its
shareholders and (2) the effects that the corporation's actions may have
in the short-term or in the long-term upon any of the following:
(i) the prospects for potential growth, development, produc-
tivity and profitability of the corporation;
(ii) the corporation's current employees;
(iii) the corporation's retired employees and other benefi-
ciaries receiving or entitled to receive retirement, wel-
fare or similar benefits from or pursuant to any plan
sponsored, or agreement entered into by the
corporation;
(iv) the corporation's customers and creditors; and
(v) the ability of the corporation to provide, as a going con-
cern goods, services, employment opportunities and em-
ployment benefits and otherwise contribute to the
communities in which it does business.3
Under the Microscope, Fin. Times, Oct. 23, 1989, at 14, col. 4.
36. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363(b) (Purdon Supp. 1988).
37. CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (West 1987); 1989 FLA. SESS. LAW SERV. § 607.11(q) (West);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32 8.85 (1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-29.2 (Burns 1987) (as amended by
S.E.A. No. 255 § 2(d) (Burns Adv. Legis. Serv. 1989)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716
(Supp. 1985); Mass. Gen. L. ch. 172, § 13 (1987) (as amended by 1989 Mass. Adv. Legis.
Serv. Ch. 242 § 15 (Law. Co-op)); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 351.347 (Vernon Supp. 1988); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2732 (Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 14A:10A-2 (West 1986); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 1987) (as amended
by 1989 N.Y. LAws Ch. 228); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson Supp. 1988);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-35-202 (1988); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 180.305 (West Supp. 1988). Accord-
ing to the Investor Responsibility Research Center, twenty-three states have adopted laws
that allow or require directors faced with a hostile tender offer to consider non-monetary
factors. De Facto Federal Anti-Bidder Stance Exists Through State Laws, IRRC Says, 21
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1501 (Oct. 6, 1989).
38. E.g., Mo, ANN. STAT. § 351.347-1.(1) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
39. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 1987) (as amended by 1989 N.Y. Laws
Ch. 228).
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Although differently phrased, the stakeholder statutes are based on a
legislative determination that legitimate non-shareholder interests are
harmed by takeovers and therefore the traditional principle that directors
faced with a takeover owe their allegiance exclusively to shareholders is
unsatisfactory. The statutes also endorse the value of maintaining corpo-
rate independence. Yet, giving directors the right to consider non-share-
holder constituencies is different from imposing upon them the obligation
to do so. As demonstrated by a case interpreting the Wisconsin stake-
holder statute, these laws merely give directors the protection of the busi-
ness judgment rule if they consider the interests of non-shareholder
constituencies."
Whether and to what extent the stakeholder statutes change existing
law is an interesting question. Delaware does not have a stakeholder stat-
ute. In Grand Metropolitan Public Limited Company v. The Pillsbury
Company,41 the Delaware chancery court permitted directors engaged in
defensive maneuvers to consider non-shareholder constituencies. Yet, in
Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp.,42 the court, in ruling on the
legality of a defensive employee stock option plan, held that a director
may only consider non-shareholder constituencies if the effect on such
constituencies might ultimately have a positive economic impact on
shareholders.
Although it has been argued that stakeholder statutes do not change
the law on directors' duties, 43 they do work a shift in the power to effect
the outcome of a takeover battle from shareholders to the board. Further,
they particularly encourage directors to consider employee interests, and
the employees with whom the directors have the greatest contact and af-
finity are a corporation's officers. If the interests of management can thus
be juxtaposed with stockholder interests, the loyalties of directors become
confused. The latitude to consider multiple constituencies is likely to be-
come a legal fiction for the erosion of shareholder rights.
2. Affirmative duties
Under classic American political theory, the interests of labor and
management are adversarial and the public interest is best protected by
guaranteeing labor's collective bargaining rights. Duties owed by manage-
ment or directors to employees are imposed by statutes rather than the
common law. 4 Further, employee representation on boards of directors is
40. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Wisc.
1989).
41. 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
42. 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989).
43. See Franklin, Effect on 'Stakeholders' Is Factor to Consider in Takeovers,
N.Y.L.J. July 6, 1989, at 5, col. 3; Securities Attorney Stresses Importance of Putting
Poison Pills In Place Early, 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 696 (May 12, 1989).
44. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). The view that
federal labor legislation is premised on an adversarial labor-management relationship which
precludes a duty by management to consider employee interests in major corporate deci-
[Vol. 25
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rare and generally considered rife with conflicts of interest. 5 The idea
that directors can even consider employee interests in a takeover is there-
fore novel and the idea that directors should owe a duty to employees in a
takeover is contrary to long standing legal principles. Nevertheless, the
traumatic impact on both labor and the public of takeovers and restruc-
turings of U.S. businesses in recent years has given rise to at least the
question of what priority employee interests should have when there is a
change of corporate control.
There are serious differences of opinion about whether takeovers, on
balance, are good or bad for the economy, and in particular employ-
ment.46 Although the argument can be made that takeovers do not de-
stroy jobs in the long run,'47 they frequently do in the short run,48 and
there is a perception that shareholder and employee interests in most
takeovers or restructurings are antagonistic.
49
In some change of control situations, unions have played a key role in
assisting management in either restructuring or resisting a hostile bid.50
Employee stock ownership plans have been utilized as a takeover defense
mechanism.51 Some unions have inserted anti-takeover devices in collec-
tive bargaining agreements.52
The support which organized labor has given to the stakeholder stat-
utes suggests that the power directors have been given to consider the
interests of employees in responding to a takeover could be transformed
into a duty. Such a duty may be presaged in the Massachusetts stake-
holder statute which imposes on tender offerors the obligation to honor
sions is suggested by First National Maintenance Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board,
452 U.S. 666 (1981).
45. Lipton, supra note 33, at 43-46. See Buss, UAW Chief Is In an Awkward Spot,
Advising Restraint in Chrysler Talks, Wall St. J., Aug. 12, 1982, at 21, col. 4; Doug Fraser's
Conflicts, Wall St. J., Sept. 22, 1982, at 30, col. 1.
46. See Leveraged Buyouts and Corporate Debt: Hearing Before the Senate Finance
Comm., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) [hereinafter Hearings].
47. Statement of Joseph A. Grundfest, U. S. Commissioner, Securities and Exchange
Commission, Before the Judiciary Committee of the Maryland House of Delegates, Concern-
ing H.R. 1321, at 17 (Mar. 2, 1988).
48. Hearings, supra note 46, Pt. 3, at 20-26 (testimony of Lane Kirkland); Id. at 29-32
(testimony of Bruce Smart).
49. Remarks of David S. Ruder, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission,
Before the American Banker Bond Buyer Conference on Strategic Corporate Restructuring
and Financing 3, New York City (May 22, 1989) (SEC News Release).
50. See Ansberry & Valente, UAL May Be Winging Its Way Toward Strife If Em-
ployee Buyout Succeeds, Some Warn, Wall St. J. Europe, Sept. 27, 1989, at 5, col. 2; Fisher,
Safeway Buyout: A Success Story, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1988, at D1, col. 4; Valente &
Smith, United Air Pilots Face Cuts in Wages, Overtime Pay, Vacation to Finance Bid,
Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 1989, at A4, col. 2.
51. Trachtenberg, Union Leader Enters the Buy-out Fray, Wall St. J., June 1, 1989,
at B8, col. 3. See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989).
See also Burr, ESOPs Boom As A Defense, Pensions & Investment Age, April 17, 1989, at 1;
Farrell & Hoerr, ESOPs: Are They Good For You?, Business Week, May 15, 1989, at 116.
52. See Airline Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. UAL Corp., [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T
94,419 at 92,703 (7th Cir. May 4, 1989).
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existing collective bargaining agreements and in addition to give two
weeks severance pay per year of service to any employee who is laid off as
the result of a takeover." The federal law requiring corporations to give
advance notice to employees concerning plant closings5 ' was predicated
on a similar anti-takeover policy. However, because this law restricted the
ability of directors and management to deal with takeovers, it was vigor-
ously opposed by the corporate community. At least one academic au-
thority has argued that employees should be compensated for the wealth
transfer to shareholders which occurs in a takeover where employment is
terminated."' Professor Coffee argues that employees are unable to pro-
tect themselves against such losses (but bondholders can.)" Such an ar-
gument is not tantamount to the idea that directors should have a direct
duty to employees imposed upon them.
As a matter of logic and fairness, it is not intuitively obvious why
shareholders (especially shareholders of short standing) should enjoy the
benefits of the premium in a change of control transaction and employees
(especially employees of long standing) should receive nothing but a ter-
mination notice. Although belief in markets can be utilized to justify
takeovers on efficiency grounds, it does not follow that the control pre-
mium shareholders receive in such battles should not be shared with
damaged constituencies. In effect, this is the result of "golden
parachutes" for corporate managers, as well as the statutory obligation
for severance pay in Massachusetts.
Whether the detriments employees suffer in change of control situa-
tions should be addressed by altering the duties directors owe sharehold-
ers is another question. Employees often have conflicts of interests in
takeovers since they may be major stockholders, either directly through
various employee purchase plans, or indirectly through pension plans or
employee stock ownership plans held in trust. Compelling directors to
consider employee interests in a change of control situation would only
compound these conflicts. Further, unless labor were actually represented
in the auction process, it would be difficult for boards, and reviewing
courts, to devise a fair formula for weighing employee and shareholder
interests.
53. 1989 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv., Ch. 242 §§ 9-10 (Law Co-op.) (enacting Mass. Gen.
L. ch. 149, § 20E and § 183(b)).
54. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2102-2109 (West
Supp. 1989).
55. See Roberts, President Decides Not to Veto Bill Requiring Notice of Plant Clos-
ings, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1988, at Al, col. 2. Whether employees who receive such notice are
entitled to bargain with management about the decision to close a plant is problematic. For
a discussion of the labor-management relationship, see supra note 44 and accompanying
text.
56. J. Coffee, supra note 32, at 78-81.
57. Id. at 68-71.
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C. Duties to Bondholders
1. The contract/tort dichotomy
Many observers of the American economy have expressed concern
about the leveraging of U.S. corporations involved in control transac-
tions.5s These concerns have been taken into account by the rating agen-
cies which frequently downgrade bond ratings after a takeover or buyout,
to the detriment of existing bondholders."' Although directors may owe
duties to creditors under certain circumstances, 0 the general rule, re-
cently reaffirmed in Delaware,"1 is that directors do not owe bondholders
a fiduciary duty except in extreme situations of fraud or insolvency be-
cause bondholders are not owners of the corporation, but only creditors.2
Therefore, the relationship between directors and bondholders is gov-
erned by contract law rather than tort law, and bondholders do not enjoy
the same type of fiduciary duty protection as shareholders.
There are several logical and policy flaws in this general proposition
as applied to control transactions. In general, the fiduciary duties of di-
rectors have arisen from analogies to the law of agency or trusts, in situa-
tions where one person manages another's property and has superior
knowledge and power. 3 However, the landmark cases imposing a fiduci-
ary duty on directors in novel situations have occurred where the director
has abused his power gained from this superior knowledge for personal
advantage. 4 In a control transaction where directors have negotiated for
their own advantage, to the detriment of bondholders, it seems anoma-
lous to raise shareholder interests as a complete defense, especially if
shareholders have received a generous control premium. Utilizing the fact
that this event risk was not prohibited in a bond indenture as a further
58. Hearings, supra note 46, at Pt. 3, at 4-12 (testimony of Alan Greenspan). See
Forstmann, Violating Our Rules of Prudence, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1988, at A26, col. 5;
Grant, Will History Repeat Itself?, Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1988, at A26, col. 3; Hale, How To
Lower the Leverage Boom, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1988, at A22, col. 3; Corporate Debt Rises
Despite Worries, Wall St. J., June 26, 1989, at Al, col. 5.
59. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. CoRP. L. 205, 208-09 (1988);
Mitchell, Junk Bonds Fail to Recover From Recession Scare, Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 1989, at
C1, col. 3; Junk Bond Defaults Are Expected to Increase, S&P Official Warns, 20 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 334 (Mar. 4, 1988).
60. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-10 (1939).
61. Simons v. Cogan, 542 A.2d 785 (Del. Ch. 1987), afl'd, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988).
Another relevant case is Revlon Inc. v. McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986).
62. See e.g., Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships Legal Theory In a Time of Re-
structuring, 1989 DuKE L.J. 92, 118.
63. See, e.g., Jacobson, Capturing Fiduciary Obligation: Shepherd's Law of Fiducia-
ries, 3 CARDozo L. REV. 519, 524 (1982). Cases which impose fiduciary duties to creditors
also have used the trust analogy. Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436 (C.C.D. Me. 1824)
(No. 17,944).
64. See Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955);
Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 243 N.Y.
483, 121 N.E. 378 (1918). See also In re Cady Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (director
was member of broker-dealer firm).
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defense treats a bond issuance like an arms length bargain between two
equal parties. The realities of the bond market may be somewhat differ-
ent, at least where the issuer is a public company and the bonds are
traded on public securities markets. Although institutions are capable of
exerting considerable power on issuers, in recent years this has occurred
in the form of determining the interest coupon, not the term of the inden-
ture.6 5 As debt and equity become less distinct,6 bondholders of public
companies would appear to be deserving of protection similar to suppliers
of equity capital.
At one time bondholders and other creditors were protected by regu-
lation of corporate capitalization. 67 As such protections eroded, fiduciary
duties to creditors were imposed on directors in bankruptcy and near
bankruptcy situations.68 The view that bondholders are creditors rather
than security holders leads to the principle that they need to be protected
only to the extent of guaranteeing interest and principal payments.
Therefore, insolvency is the only contingency where directors become lia-
ble for a breach of duty. If it is recognized, however, that bondholders are
also investors of capital who are concerned about market gains and losses,
event risk such as a control transaction can also become a contingency for
which directors are held to a fiduciary standard, especially if the directors
are in a position of knowledge and power superior to that of the
bondholders.
2. The new activism of bondholders
Until recently, bondholders have been silently suffering losses in con-
trol transactions, although the subject of bondholders' rights began re-
ceiving scholarly attention. 9 The RJR Nabisco, Inc. ("RJR") leveraged
buyout, however, represented such a large gain for shareholders and such
a large loss for bondholders in a transaction initiated by management in-
volving huge management profits, 0 that certain bondholders were
prompted to take action. It is noteworthy that these activist bondholders
were insurance companies, the leader of which was Metropolitan Life In-
surance Company ("MetLife").72 Suits were instituted alleging breaches
of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violations of the
antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws and breaches of fiduci-
65. Stine & Herman, Investor Fears of Takeovers, Buy-Outs May Force Companies to
Pay More in Issuing New Bonds, Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 1988, at C21, col. 1; McDaniel, supra
note 59, at 238-45.
66. McDaniel, supra note 59, at 221.
67. Bratton, supra note 62, at 107. For an additional source discussing directors' du-
ties and liabilities toward bondholders and creditors, see infra note 106.
68. Id. at 110-11.
69. Bratton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 1984 Wxis. L.
REv. 667; McDaniel, supra note 59; Coffee, supra note 32.
70. History of the RJR Takeover, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1988, at D15, col. 3.
71. Logan & Lamb, Pending Bondholder Suits Could Have Broad Ramifications,
N.Y.L.J., June 5, 1988, at 37, col. 4.
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ary duty.7 2
Thus far, the plaintiff bondholders have not enjoyed much success.
Judge Walker in the Southern District of New York dismissed the federal
cases against RJR and its chief executive officer brought for equitable
relief, on cross summary judgment motions, on the grounds that given the
sophistication of the plaintiff bondholders there was no justification for
deviating from the express terms of the bond indenture.7 3
There being no express covenant between the parties that would re-
strict the incurrence of new debt, and no perceived direction to that
end from covenants that are express, this Court will not imply a cove-
nant to prevent the recent LBO and thereby create an indenture term
that, while bargained for in other contexts, was not bargained for here
and was not even within the mutual contemplation of the partiesY4
A similar case involving the takeover of Federated Department
Stores, Inc. ("Federated") by Campeau Corporation ("Campeau") was
brought by Hartford Fire Insurance Company ("Hartford") against Fed-
erated, Campeau, various officers and directors of Federated and invest-
ment banking houses which acted as the underwriters for an issuance of
$500 million of Federated debt securities, in the form of five-year 9.375%
notes ("Notes").7 5 Hartford had purchased $25 million of the Notes at
face value on October 22, 1987, pursuant to a shelf registration offering.
The Notes were investment grade, rated "AA-" by Standard & Poor's and
"Aa2" by Moody's. After the Campeau takeover of Federated in early
1988, the Notes were downgraded to "B" by Standard & Poor's and "B2"
by Moody's, with a resulting drop in the market value of the Notes. Hart-
ford sold its Notes in November 1988 at a loss of $4.33 million.
Hartford sued for alleged violations of the federal securities laws and
for a variety of state law claims, but the defendants' motion for summary
judgment was granted by Judge Sweet in the Southern District of New
York. The gist of the fraud charges in the complaint was that Federated's
registration statement and related documents were misleading because
they failed to disclose that Federated was a potential takeover target and
that a leveraged transaction would destroy the value of the Notes as in-
vestment grade securities. The court granted summary judgment on this
claim on the ground that any possible takeover of Federated was not, as
of the date of the allegedly misleading documents, "material" under the
test of materiality set forth in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.7 6 This holding
72. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 534 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
73. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504-05 (S.D.N.Y.
1989).
74. Id. at 1508. This case was on appeal to the Second Circuit as of the date of this
article.
75. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,744 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 1989).
76. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
1990]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
seems to give short shrift to the centrality of ratings to bond offerings,
but also seems to be based on the hostile nature of the Campeau offer.
The state law claims for breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, promissory estoppel and mistake were dismissed on the
ground that the indenture covering the Notes did not prohibit mergers
and expressly permitted Federated to incur additional debt provided it
secured the Notes "equally and ratably" with any new debt guaranteed
by Federated's assets. A claim for unjust enrichment on the grounds that
the defendants "expropriated" Hartford's investment, enriching them-
selves and their stockholders at Hartford's expense was dismissed on the
ground that there was no express contract governing the subject matter
that was breached. Similarly, a claim against Campeau for tortious inter-
ference with contractual relations was dismissed because there was no
breach of contract.
The message of the Metlife and Hartford cases is that bondholders
should protect themselves against leveraged transactions by negotiating
appropriate covenants in indentures. Such covenants could, for example,
bar mergers; or in the event of a "bad" merger harmful to bondholders,
make the bonds convertible or require their redemption; or restrict addi-
tional debt or debt to equity ratios that would impair an investment
grade rating. While such covenants could protect future bondholders
against the type of downgrading involved in the RJR and Federated take-
overs, the cases do not address the basic questions of why common share-
holders should be so strongly preferred over bondholders or why directors
should not be held accountable for actions that inflict serious damage on
bondholders.
The stakeholder statutes discussed above" are a statutory response
to the plight of bondholders and other creditors in takeovers and permit,
but do not require, directors to consider the interests of bondholders in a
control transaction. The common law in Delaware (which does not have a
stakeholder statute) would appear to be to the contrary. Yet, the very
case frequently cited for the proposition that directors cannot prefer the
interests of bondholders to shareholders, Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews and
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 8 was utilized by the chief executive officer of Met-
Life, John J. Creedon, Jr., to argue that a duty to treat bondholders fairly
in leveraged transactions should be imposed on directors. 9 Creedon has
also urged an amendment to the federal securities laws which would re-
quire issuers to disclose the probable consequences of a tender offer on all
a corporation's constituencies."
MetLife's legislative proposals have gone beyond the stakeholder
statutes. A bill introduced at its behest in New York State would require
an issuer to repurchase bonds as maturing more than two years from the
77. For a discussion of "stakeholder" issues, see supra notes 29-43 and accompanying
text.
78. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
79. Hearings, supra note 46, Pt. 3, at 26-32 (testimony of John J. Creedon, Jr.).
80. Id. at 27.
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date of issuance if there is an announcement of a control transaction, and
thirty days after the announcement that the bonds have dropped more
than ten percent in value."' The bill essentially treats the control transac-
tion as a tort against bondholders. What effect such a law might have on
the duty of directors to bondholders in a takeover or restructuring is an
interesting question. The bill is a signal, however, that influential institu-
tional investors are not satisfied with permitting directors to consider
bondholder interests. They are seeking more affirmative protection.
II. DUTIES OF DIRECTORS UNDER U.K. LAW
A. Generally
Directors in the United Kingdom, like directors in the United States,
owe duties of care and loyalty to their corporations. The duty of care can
be expressed as the duty of skill and care a person of the director's
knowledge and experience is capable of exercising. 82 In addition, a direc-
tor has a duty of absolute loyalty and utmost good faith."5
1. Duties to the corporation
One difference between U.K. and U.S. law is that in Britain, the duty
of directors is owed to the corporation as a whole, rather than directly to
shareholders.8 4 It may be argued that this difference is only one of em-
phasis since the U.K. director's duty to the company is basically a duty to
shareholders85 Moreover, in the United States, a director owes duties to
the shareholders as a body, not a duty to individual shareholders."8 Nev-
ertheless, a U.K. director's duty is enforceable only in an action by the
corporation, not in an action by shareholders.8 '
In the specific context of a takeover bid, the duty of care has been
interpreted as a duty to the shareholders not to act recklessly in deciding
between two rival bids.s Yet, a U.K. board has no duty to get the best
price for shareholders through an auction. Rather, the general process fol-
lowed in takeovers encourages the board to deal with one bidder at a
81. S. 6326, 212th Leg. Sess., N.Y. (1989). See Franklin, MetLife Looks for Help,
N.Y.L.J., May 11, 1989, at 5, col. 3.
82. P. LoosE & J. YELLAND, THE COMPANY DIRECTOR § 4.8.1 (1987).
83. Id. at § 4.3.
84. Percival v. Wright, 2 Ch. 421 71 L.J. ch. 846 (1902).
85. E.g., Hutton v. West Cork Ry. Co., 23 Ch. D. 654, 671 (1883).
86. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 658, -, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (1933). But see Strong v.
Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909) (director may have duty to individual shareholder in some
circumstances). Under the federal securities laws it is easier for individual shareholders to
enforce the obligations imposed on directors. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §
20A, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982).
87. Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461, 490, 67 Eng. Rep. 189, 202 (1843). See J. FARRAR, N.
FUREY & B. HANNIGAN, FARRAR's COMPANY LAW 382-84 (1988).
88. Heron Int'l Ltd. v. Lord Grade, B.C.L.C. 244, 261-62 (1983). This duty runs di-
rectly to shareholders. See J. FARRAR, supra note 87 at 325-26.
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time."9 Insofar as the duty of loyalty is concerned, directors of a target
company have a duty to act bona fide in the best interests of the com-
pany as a whole and therefore are precluded from taking such defensive
measures as diluting control by the issuance of new share. 90
The conduct of directors in contests for corporate control in the
United Kingdom is regulated not only by company law and judicial deci-
sions, but also by the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers ("City
Code"), which is supervised by the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers
("Panel").9' The Panel is a self-regulatory body and the City Code does
not have the force of law. Nevertheless, because of the acceptance and
support given to the City Code and Panel by securities and banking regu-
lators, the Panel's decisions are obeyed. In addition, since the Panel is a
semi-public body, its opinions are subject to judicial review. 2
The City Code sets forth a limited number of general principles and
then detailed rules for the conduct of a takeover bid. Nevertheless, con-
siderable latitude is left to the Panel to interpret the propriety of a
board's conduct in the context of a particular bid. The two most impor-
tant general principles in the City Code are that the shareholders of an
offeree company are to decide whether or not an offer should succeed,
and that all equity holders must be treated equally. 3 The board of a tar-
get company is obligated to seek independent outside financial advice
when a bid is made, and then communicate the substance of such advice
to the company's shareholders.9 4
In addition, after an offer is communicated to the board, or even if a
board has reason to believe an offer is imminent, the offeree board is pro-
hibited from taking any action, without the approval of shareholders in a
general meeting "which could effectively result in any bona fide offer be-
ing frustrated or in the shareholders being denied an opportunity to de-
cide on its merits. ' 95 Because of this anti-frustration provision the law in
the United Kingdom would appear to favor shareholders, or at least their
freedom of choice when presented with a takeover, to a greater extent
than the law in the United States.9"
89. Bartos & Sellars, Buyouts: Contrasting Techniques in the US and UK, 8 INT'L
FIN. L. RE V. 24, 28-29 (1989).
90. Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd., 1967 Ch. 254; PALMER'S COMPANY LAW 940-43 (C.
Schmitthoff ed. 1987).
91. The City Code on Take-overs and Mergers (1988) [hereinafter "City Code"] (for
an old text (pre-revision) of the City Code, see A. JOHNSTON, THE CITY TAKEOVER CODE
(1980)). See Brayne, Tender Offers Involving U.K. Companies, 21 REv. SEC. & COMM. REG.
(Standard & Poor's), Apr. 27, 1988, at 67, 70.
92. MacLachlan & Mackesy, Acquisitions of Companies in Europe-Practicability,
Disclosure, and Regulation: An Overview, 23 INT'L LAW. 373, 386-87 (1989). See R. v. Panel
on Take-Overs and Mergers, Ex Parte Datafin PLC 1 All E.R. 564 (1987).
93. MacLachlan, supra note 92, at 387-88.
94. City Code, supra note 91, Rule 3.1.
95. City Code, supra note 91, General Principle 7. Prohibitions against specific types
of "poison pills" are enumerated in Rule 21. These include the issuance of new shares, the
disposition of material assets and contracts not in the ordinary course of business.
96. See Takeovers-The Right Way to Regulate the Market, The Economist, Sept.
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2. Duty to employees
In contrast to the United States, the board of a U.K. corporation has
a specific, statutorily imposed duty to employees.17 At one time, this was
not true, and directors were not permitted to consider the interests of
shareholders."' This principle arose in cases involving payment to termi-
nated employees in connection with a sale or winding up of a business.
The courts held that such payment would not further any business pur-
pose of the corporation and therefore was the payment of a benefit to
employees belonging to the shareholders. 9
In 1980 these cases were specifically overruled by statute so that U.K.
law now provides that:
The matters to which the directors of a company are to have regard in
the performance of their functions include the interests of the com-
pany's employees in general, as well as the interests of its members.' °0
This duty, like a director's duty to shareholders, is owed to the company
alone and "is enforceable in the same way as any other fiduciary duty
owed to a company by its directors."'' 1
The statute thus requires, and does not merely permit, directors to
take into account employee, as well as shareholder interests. However, it
gives no guidance as to how to reconcile these interests if they conflict,
and no enforcement power to employees. Presumably this is a matter for
the business judgment of the directors. 102 The potential conflict between
a duty to employees and a duty to shareholders in a takeover does not
appear to have surfaced as a basis for recommending against a takeover,
or even trying to defeat a takeover, perhaps because of the anti-frustra-
tion provision of the City Code. In the event a board determined to use
the duty to employees as a weapon in a contest for corporate control, it is
interesting to speculate whether the general statutory duty to employees
would supersede the specific anti-frustration provisions of the non-statu-
tory City Code.
23, 1989 at 21-22; A Tale of Two Takeovers, Wall St. J., July 17, 1989, at A10, col. 1. The
latest draft of the ALI corporate governance project provides that directors of U.S. corpora-
tions "may take an action that has the foreseeable effect of blocking an unsolicited tender
offer ... unless the action would materially disfavor the long-term interests of the share-
holders." ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 8, at § 6.02 p. 27 (Discussion Draft No. 2, Apr. 20,
1989).
97. Companies Act 1985, § 309.
98. Note, The Companies Act, 1980: Its Effects on British Corporate Law, 4 Nw J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 551, 568 (1982).
99. Parke v. Daily News Ltd., [1962] Ch. 927; Hutton v. W. Cork Ry. Co., [1883] 23
Ch. D. 654.
100. Companies Act of 1985, § 309 (1). See also § 719 (1).
101. Companies Act of 1985, § 309 (2).
102. PALMER, supra note 90, at 937.
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3. Duty to creditors
The traditional U.K. view is that directors do not owe a fiduciary
duty to creditors.20 3 This view was questioned by the House of Lords in
Winkworth v. Edward Baron Development Co.,10' which involved a claim
by a wife, who also was a director and stockholder, trying to enforce an
equitable interest in the matrimonial home, owned by the company,
against a mortgagee seeking possession. The husband was the other direc-
tor and shareholder. The case seems to have been decided on the law
relating to equitable interests and its peculiar facts, without discussion of
prior authorities on a director's duty to creditors. However, in passing,
the court stated:
A duty is owed by the directors to the company and to the creditors of
the company to ensure that the affairs of the company are properly
administered and that its property is not dissipated or exploited for the
benefit of the directors themselves to the prejudice of the creditors.1'0
In the United Kingdom, as in the United States, directors owe a fidu-
ciary duty to creditors in an insolvency or voluntary winding up.' In-
deed, a statutory duty to creditors is imposed when an insolvency
becomes inevitable. 10 7 In addition, the protection of creditor interests
through statutory regulation of company capitalization probably is more
stringent in the United Kingdom than in the United States."0 "
The issue of whether a duty to creditors could arise in a highly lever-
aged takeover or restructuring that diminished the value of outstanding
bonds does not appear to have arisen in the United Kingdom, perhaps
because of the relative lack of leverage in takeover financings. The poten-
tial for such a question was demonstrated in the proposed takeover by Sir
James Goldsmith for B.A.T. Industries ("B.A.T."), which did involve suf-
ficient leverage to cause B.A.T. to pull back a planned debenture offering
after the takeover bid was announced.' 0 9
103. Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co. v. Multinational Gas and Petrochemi-
cal Services Ltd., [1983] Ch. 258, 288.
104. [1987] 1 All E.R. 114.
105. Id. at 118. See also Nicholson v. Permakraft (NZ) Ltd., [1985] N.Z.L.R. 242.
106. C. RYAN, COMPANY DIREcTORS' LIABILITIES, RIGHTS AND DUTIES 121 (1987).
107. Insolvency Act 1986, § 214.
108. See PALMER, supra note 90, at 492-97 (description of capital controls). As a gen-
eral matter, U.S. corporate and securities law has not regulated corporate capitalization,
although some state "Blue Sky" merit statutes block corporations with unfair capital struc-
tures from making public offerings. See generally Karmel, Blue-Sky Merit Regulation: Ben-
efit to Investors or Burden on Commerce?, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 105 (1987). Early and
rather crude creditor protection devices like par value have generally fallen into disuse, and
more recent creditor protection concepts like equitable subordination and veil piercing per-
mit creditors to seize assets no longer held by an insolvent corporation. See generally R.
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 2.1-.6, at 35-92, § 17.1.2, at 707-15 (1986). None of these devices
are of much help to bondholders confronted by a leveraged restructuring that downgrades
bond ratings.
109. Peers & Forman, B.A.T. withdraws $400 Million Issue of Eurobonds in Wake of
Hostile Bid, Wall St. J., July 14, 1989 at C14, col. 1; See Bridging the Mezzanine Gap, The
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III. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EC
A. Company Law Harmonization
A discussion of the duties of directors in countries other than the
United States and the United Kingdom is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle. Nevertheless, the possible impact of European Community develop-
ments on company law in the United Kingdom and the future conduct of
takeovers is too important not to mention. In particular, controversial
proposals for worker participation in the corporate management structure
could alter the way in which directors balance shareholder, employee, and
creditor interests.
For approximately two decades, the EC has been attempting to har-
monize the company and capital laws of its member states. This project is
based on two premises. First, companies are the most important economic
actors within each member state and second, harmonization of the com-
pany and capital laws will advance the goal of economic integration set
forth in the Treaty of Rome.110 Moreover, if these efforts serve to stand-
ardize the protections of shareholders and creditors who operate under a
variety of legal systems, investors will presumably be more willing to pro-
vide capital and credit which will encourage economic development."1
Many of the EC Directives on capital and company law therefore deal
with disclosure and accounting standards'12 as well as mergers and split
ups."13 Also of some interest with regard to protection of creditor interests
is the Second Directive which provides for the maintenance of a com-
pany's minimum or stated capital." 4
Of relevance to the question of a director's duty to non-shareholder
constituencies are the proposed Fifth Directive on the harmonization of
company law of EC member states,"15 the Vredeling Proposal,"I6 and the
recent proposals for a Council Regulation"7 and Council Directive 18 on a
statute for a European company, which is called a Societas Europaea
Economist, Apr. 22, 1989, at 73, col. 1.
110. R BUXBAUM & K. HoPT, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BusINEss ENTERPRISE 167
(1988).
111. Id. at 201. Federal chartering in the United States has never gathered much po-
litical support, despite criticisms of state chartering as a race to the bottom. See Cary, Fed-
eralism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974). See also
Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDozo L. REV. 709 (1987).
112. E.g., First Directive 11, J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 65) 8 (Mar. 14, 1968) (uniform
minimum disclosure); Fourth Directive, 21 O.J. Eum COMM. (No. L 222) 11 (Aug. 14, 1978)
(accounting and publication of annual reports); Seventh Directive, 26 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No.
L 193) 1 (July 18, 1983) (accounting of groups); Eighth Directive, 27 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L
126) 20 (May 12, 1984) (auditor qualifications).
113. E.g., Third Directive, O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 295) 36 (Oct. 20, 1978) (mergers);
Sixth Directive, O.J. Comm. Eup. (No. L 378) 47 (Dec. 31, 1982) (divisions).
114. O.J. EUR. CoMm. (No. L 26) 1 (Jan. 30, 1977).
115. O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. C 131) 49 (Dec. 13, 1972).
116. O.J. Eua. CoMm. (No. C 297) 3 (Nov. 15, 1980).
117. O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. C 263) 41 (Aug. 25, 1989) [hereinafter "SE Statute"].
118. O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. C 263) 69 (Aug. 25, 1989) [hereinafter "SE Directive'].
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("SE"). All of these proposals are very controversial because they attempt
to inject some form of labor co-determination into the structure of a cor-
poration.'19 In particular, the British have resisted the concept of worker
participation on corporate boards, or even labor consultation on signifi-
cant corporate decisions. 2 '
Worker participation is an amorphous concept which ranges from the
German model of equal representation of employees and shareholders on
the supervisory boards of corporate decision-making bodies to any insti-
tution through which labor may limit management prerogatives, including
collective bargaining.' 2' The Fifth Directive would have mandated a two-
tier corporate board structure, with a supervisory board and a manage-
ment board. Labor would have been represented on the supervisory board
in some way. However, the European Parliament expressed reservations
about the worker participation provisions and the proposed Fifth Direc-
tive could not be adopted.'2 2 After more than a decade of political maneu-
vering, an amended Fifth Directive 2 3 which was more flexible was
proposed, allowing companies to choose a two-tier or single-tier board
structure. This amended proposal would only have applied to companies
with more than 1,000 employees. In addition, four options for worker par-
ticipation were put forward, ranging from employee participation on the
supervisory board to collective bargaining.""
Because of the controversy over worker participation, prospects are
uncertain for the adoption of the Fifth Directive as a technique for har-
monizing company law. In the meantime, however, a proposal for an SE,
which would be a company incorporated under EC rather than national
law, has been put forward." 5 The SE Statute is based on national com-
pany law and the amended Fifth Directive and provides that manage-
ment of the SE can be either by a management board, with a supervisory
board monitoring its activities, or an administrative board."16 The worker
participation provisions of the SE Statute and SE Directive have been
watered down, but not eliminated. An SE will be able to choose one of
three systems for worker participation: labor representatives on the su-
pervisory board,12 7 a separate workers' representative body,"28 or any
119. See BUXBAUM, supra note 110, at 259-62; See also, Note, The Proposed Vredeling
Directive: A Modest Proposal or the Exportation of Industrial Democracy?, 70 VA. L, REV.
1469 (1984) (discussion of legislative protection for corporate employees).
120. See Dawkins, Brussels Company Law Plan Threatened, Fin. Times, July 19,
1989 at 1, col. 8; Jones, Managers Attack EC Proposals, Fin. Times, May 30, 1989, at 4, col.
4.
121. Constas, The Developing European Community Law of Worker Participation in
Management, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 93, 94 (1978).
122. BUXBAUM, supra note 110, at 259.
123. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 240) 2 (Sept. 9, 1983).
124. See Note, supra note 119, at 1475.
125. SE Statute, supra note 123.
126. Id. at 25-29.
127. SE Directive, supra note 118, at Articles 3-4.
128. Id. at Article 5.
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other agreement concluded between management and labor.129 Although
this third model would appear to sanction collective bargaining as worker
participation, it makes clear that employees will at least have rights of
information and consultation so that they can participate in supervision
of management and the strategic development of the SE."30
The SE uses a carrot, rather than a stick, approach to injecting
worker participation into European companies. An SE will have signifi-
cant tax and other advantages over national companies, and therefore
even U.K. business organizations may decide to form SEs, despite Mrs.
Thatcher's general opposition to worker participation.13' In any event, the
relationship of U.K. directors and employees necessarily will be influ-
enced by the strong sentiments in Brussels favoring worker participation.
What effect this will have on takeovers remains to be seen. The political
premises underlying the U.S. stakeholder and plant closing notification
statutes are very similar to the EC initiatives on labor participation in
strategic decisionmaking. The difference is that European directors may
be compelled, rather than merely permitted, to take employee interests
into account in control transactions.
B. The Takeover Directive
An EC proposed Thirteenth Directive on Company Law concerning
Takeover and Other General Bids 3' could change the manner in which
takeovers are regulated in the United Kingdom and other European
countries as well. In general, the anti-frustration provisions of the City
Code are not mirrored in the regulations or practices of continental Euro-
pean countries, where a variety of takeover defenses are common and
lawful. 3' The Thirteenth Directive generally would adopt the U.K. model
of takeover regulation in substance, but would substitute a statutory
method of regulation for the City Code and Panel.
Of particular relevance to this article are provisions relating to con-
duct of offeree companies following receipt of a notice of a bid. As soon as
an offeree company received such notice, it would be prohibited, without
shareholder approval at a general meeting, from issuing voting securities
or securities convertible into voting securities or "engaging in transactions
which do not have the character of current operations concluded under
normal conditions," unless authorized by a competent supervisory regula-
tory authority."14 Other features of the U.K. regulatory scheme include
129. Id. at Article 6.
130. Id. at Articles 2, 6.
131. See Gapper, Fowler Attacks EC's Proposal to Enforce Worker Involvement, Fin.
Times, Oct. 23, 1989, at 12, col. 4; Carrots for Euroco, The Economist, July 15, 1989, at 66,
col. 1.
132. O.J. Eua Comm. (No. C 64) 8 (Mar. 14, 1989) [hereinafter "Takeover Directive"].
This article will not discuss EC proposals concerning concentration in mergers and acquisi-
tions, which deal with antitrust concerns.
133. MacLachlan, supra note 92, at 375-80.
134. Takeover Directive, supra note 132, at Article 8.
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provisions for the equal treatment of shareholders, mandated indepen-
dent advice for boards, a timetable for the completion of bids and a trig-
ger for circumstances under which a full bid must be made. In many
respects, the Thirteenth Directive would conform to the Williams Act in
the U.S. However, one significant difference in addition to the anti-frus-
tration provision is the requirement for anyone with 331/3 % of a com-
pany's voting securities to make a 100% bid for the Company."',
Although the British are resisting the Thirteenth Directive, primarily be-
cause it would abolish the self-regulatory scheme of the City Code and
Panel,136 the Directive already is influencing legal initiatives in other
member states. 37
One interesting feature of the Thirteenth Directive is a provision
that would require the target board to communicate with its workers' rep-
resentatives concerning the bid and the board's response to it.1 38 The
likelihood of mandating meaningful employee participation in takeover
transactions appears slim, however.1 3
CONCLUSION
There are a variety of reasons for a comparative law analysis. One is
that new and better solutions to common problems may be discovered.
Another reason for comparing law that regulates business activity, in the
context of a global economy, is that different regulation may promote or
disadvantage business activity in a particular country.
This article suggests two potentially contradictory trends in the law
concerning control transactions in the United States, the United King-
dom, and the EC. As a general matter, mergers and acquisitions, includ-
ing transnational business combinations, are viewed as an efficient
mechanism for restructuring businesses and to some degree as a check on
management. To enhance efficiency in the allocation of resources, and the
traditional duty of directors to shareholders, investor protection regula-
tion has been enacted. Current takeover regulation in the United King-
135. Id. at Article 4. The Williams Act is contained in §§ 13(d) and (e), and 14(d), (e)
and (f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78m(d) and (e) and n(d), (e) and
(f), and the regulations thereunder. The Williams Act has no mandatory bid provision. Con-
sequently, because the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has not defined the
term "tender offer," control can be acquired without equal treatment of shareholders. See
Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985).
Corporate defenses against takeover bids do not violate federal law and SEC views on
this subject have been rejected by the Delaware Supreme Court. See Moran v. Household
International, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). Further, state statutes which operate as de-
fensive mechanisms for target corporations have been upheld as constitutional and not pre-
empted by the Williams Act. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
136. Lambert, Brussels Fights for Accord on Takeover Bids, Fin. Times, Oct. 2, 1989,
at 6, col. 4.
137. See, e.g., Dawkins, New French Takeover Code, Fin. Times, Sept. 30-Oct. 1, 1989,
at 2, col. 1.
138. Takeover Directive, supra note 132, at Article 19.
139. Lambert, supra note 136.
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dom would appear to better protect shareholders in a control transaction
than the Williams Act. If the proposed EC Takeover Directive is adopted,
it will move continental countries in the direction of U.K. law and the
substance of U.K. law will not change.
At the same time, the demands of labor to have a voice in major
corporate decisions, including control transactions, are being translated
into law in the United States and the United Kingdom. Developments in
the EC appear likely to move U.K. law further in this direction. Credi-
tors, like employees, can assert they have been disadvantaged by a control
transaction. While such claims have received less attention and sympa-
thy, developments serving to protect labor interests, like the U.S. stake-
holder statutes, may have the ancillary effect of also assisting creditors.
These moves to protect shareholders, employees, and creditors are
difficult to reconcile with one another or with the traditional fiduciary
duty which directors owe to shareholders. Changing this duty to allow
directors to balance employee, creditor, and shareholder interests could
give directors a wide latitude with inadequate accountability to any con-
stituency. If the law continues to move in this direction, some standard
for judging directors' conduct, beyond the platitudes of fiduciary duty,
will have to be developed. Providing specific protections to employees and
creditors injured by a control transaction, possibly by granting them a
share in the control premium, might be better public policy.
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